POLITICAL
WILL AND ANTICORRUPTION CRUSADE MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA
John N. N. Ugoani
College of Management and Social Sciences, Rhema University, Nigeria
E-mail: drjohnugoani@yahoo.com
Submission: 07/10/2015
Accept: 13/10/2015
ABSTRACT
Corruption in all ramifications has
continued to jeopardize the efforts of governments in forging national unity,
infrastructural development and in most cases, leaving the majority of a
nation’s citizens to live in absolute poverty. The phenomenon has persisted in
many countries mostly due to weak political will or the lack of it necessary to
curb the menace. In its simplest form corruption reflects the use of public
office for private gain. As a remedy to this there should be a demonstration of
credible intent by political leaders, stakeholders groups to attack perceived
causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level. This demonstration of
credible capacity reflects political will. The political will to curb
corruption is also the political will to pursue other goals like good
governance and national unity. Political will is not equivalent to political
manifesto rhetoric or pressure group statements. Rather, it is the
manifestation of a robust system of checks and balances and strong political
institutions for combating corruption and promoting good governance as well as
restoring trust and confidence in democratic politics. Gowon’s proposal reflects strong political will for
good governance, because, if political will is to be more than just a slogan,
it must be understood in a broad context. This reinforces the believe that if
there is an absence of political will at the top, there will be a general lack
of commitment to combat corruption, and pursue other important national goals
as political development and poverty reduction. The exploratory research design
was adopted for the study. Secondary data were generated
through a format designed by the investigator for the purpose of the study.
Because of the sensitive nature of the study primary data were also generate
through a Liker-type questionnaire to supplement the secondary data. Data
generated were analyzed through descriptive and X2 statistics and
presented in tables with absolute figures capable of easy understanding and
further analysis. It was found that political will is essential in
anticorruption crusade management in Nigeria, and has the reciprocal dimension
of providing the incentives for good governance of any nation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Political will involves the
demonstration of genuine aspiration of political leaders and significant
stakeholders to check perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic
level in society. Kpundeh (1999) posits that political will is a critical
starting point for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and
programmes.
According to him, the lack of
political will to systematically fight corruption allowed abusive practices to
continue and eventually became a way of life for Sierra Leoneans under former
Presidents Stevens, Momoh, and Strasser. He states that commissions of inquiry
in that country showed that corrupt practices led to the ravaging of the
treasury and contributed to the economic despondency of the country.
Corruption in its simplest terms is
the abuse of power, most often for personal gain or for the benefit of a group
to which one owes allegiance (STAPENHURST; SEDIGH, 1999). Corruption is a
destroyer; it corrodes the democratic ethos, spreads its filth and eventually
imperils democracy.
If left alone, corruption will
spread, multiply, intensify, systemize and eventually institutionalize itself,
thereby becoming the norm and no longer the exception (UNIAMIKOGBO, 2007).
Therefore, political will is seen as the manifestation of a robust system of
checks and balances and strong political institutions for combating corruption
and promoting good governance as well as restoring trust and confidence in
democratic politics.
According to Hopkinson and Pelizzo
(2006), to curb corruption effectively, the commitment of government and
parliament is above all required. If there is an absence of political will at
the top, there will be a general lack of commitment to enforce laws and punish
the corrupt. Almost all national anti-corruption agencies point to political
will as the main precondition for their effective operation. For effective
anti-corruption crusade, there must be political will at the highest level,
because malpractice at any level will undermine trust in the political system
as a whole.
Marshall (2006) posits that
leadership is necessary but not a sufficient condition for controlling
corruption, if for no other reason than that tackling corruption can unleash
opposition to reform. Therefore, Kpundeh and Dininio (2006) believe that
political will, as it applies to anti-corruption crusade is most effective when
it is institutionalized and not dependent on the personality and intentions of
a particular individual.
Accordingly, reformers can promote
institutionalization of political will by establishing and equipping political
institutions with adequate autonomy, authority, resources, and qualified
manpower. Such institutionalization grows and develops a forum of mutually
reinforcing accountability and transparency. The political will to reduce
corruption has much in common with the political will to pursue any other goal,
such as infrastructure development and poverty reduction.
Political will must be given space
to grow from within a political system and eventually becomes an integral part
of political, social and economic processes. Without the institutionalization
of political will, wedging any war against corruption will be an exercise in
futility. For example, despite the anticorruption rhetorics in Nigeria since
the military regime, and up to the present democratic experiment, and the
passage into law of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act during
the first tenure of Obasanjo’s Presidency, the wahala of massive corruption still persists in Nigeria.
Probably because of the lack of
political will to check corruption in Nigeria, Presidents, Governors,
legislators, including local government Chairmen and councilors, automatically
become billionaires once in office and even after leaving political office. The
same applies to ministers, commissioners and sundry government officials. This
happens at the detriment of infrastructural development, unemployment and
absolute poverty. It is estimated that over 70 percent of Nigerians live below
the poverty level (UGOANI, 2015).
In all efforts to combat corruption,
the commitment of elected representatives and other public officials is
pivotal. According to Staphenhurst and Sedigh (1999) if those who govern a
society lack the political will to refrain from corruption and institute
change, real reform is difficult to undertake and virtually impossible to
sustain.
In addition, pressure for reform
that stems from the lower ranks of the bureaucracy can be frustrated by the
absence of political will or interest among higher level public servants and
political office holders. Political will is critical to fight corruption in
Nigeria because the trickle down development strategies is insufficient.
Fighting corruption, human capital
development, through informal and formal employment generation and rapid
advances in public services must remain a key plank of development strategies (MANUEL,
2003). Corruption may be defined as the use of public office for private gain.
It can take on a multitude of faces; its scale can be grand or petty.
Corruption may be classified into
three broad types: state capture which is often equated with grand corruption
or political corruption, patronage and nepotism, and administrative corruption.
While these forms of corruption overlap significantly, they are not equivalent.
Patronage is politically motivated, and administrative corruption can involve
huge sums like commissions from huge rigged contracts.
Grand corruption refers to
corruption that involves extraordinary large side payments; political
corruption refers to favours exchanged for support, financial or otherwise, to
buttress or sustain the political power of individuals or groups, such as
illegal campaign contributions. Kleptocracy and cronyism are other forms of
political corruption.
In these cases, political leaders
use the organ of the state to enrich themselves, children, family members,
friends and associates through legal and illegal means. (CAMPOS; BHARGERG,
2007). It is curious that despite acceptance by governments like in Nigeria and
other late developing democracies that corruption exists and is serious, there
is always a general lack of political will to implement recommendations and the
necessary legislation to combat corruption (EMMANUEL; OMOMIA, 2012; HOPKINSON;
PELIZZO, 2006) Marshall (2006) insists that corruption is a clear threat to
development, democracy, and international security.
It distorts economic and social
development and subverts political decision-making, stunting growth and
creating political instability. Corruption is closely linked to failing public
institutions and failed public policies, undermining the legitimacy of
governments at all levels. It drains national finances, acting as a major
disincentive to securing foreign investment, as well as destroying the work
ethic of the citizens.
Corruption can have a profoundly
negative impact on patriotism and commitment to the national goals and ideals,
and it also deepens poverty. These factors combine to show that combating
corruption is an issue for both national regional and global authorities. The
monumental corruption in Nigeria today attracts global attention, to the extent
that the G.7 leaders of the world believe that the Nigerian economy is
mismanaged (TAIWO-OBALONYE, 2015).
Straw (2014) posits that there must
be transparency in governance at all levels in order to effectively tackle the
menace of corruption in Nigeria. A former British Foreign Secretary, he also
suggests that there must be incorruptible judiciary to give appropriate
penalties against corrupt officials to ensure that the war against corruption
in Nigeria succeeds – (OMOTOSO, 2013; OMOTOSO, 2011; OGUNWALE, 2012; EMMANUEL, 2014;
OBIJIOFOR, 2013; ALLI, 2012). Corruption disrupts governance, reduces the
provisions of services by the government and its institutions (UGURU; IBEOGU,
2014).
1.1
Statement of the problem
There is significant empirical
evidence that corruption exists in Nigeria, but there is no evidence that there
is the political will to check it. The wahala of serious allegations of massive
corruption in government and the oil and gas industry is monumental.
Corruption appears to be flowing
unquenchably like the River Niger in the oil and gas industry from where the
nation derives over 90 percent of its revenue. Also people in government become
billionaires overnight in a country with over 8000 abandoned projects that
would require over N5trn to complete in over 30 years, where major public
enterprises are given away on political patronage without proper valuation, and
where the majority of the citizens live in absolute poverty.
A country where 50 percent of the
federating states despite heavy borrowings cannot pay workers salaries, but
where the ex-presidents, ex-governors, ex-this and ex-that live like emperors,
must be a thoroughly corrupt country. A country with leaders who parade shining
certificates but without moral capacity and political will to deal with corruption
and promote good governance. (OMOTOSO, 2013; EMMANUEL, 2014; GABRIEL, 2015;
JEYIFO, 2013; OJO, 2015; OLABIYI, 2015; AMODU, 2015; DAILY SUN NEWS, 2015;
UGWUANYI, 2011; DAKA, 2012; ORINTUNSIN, 2014).
Without the benefit of accurate
statistics , it is evident that from organized media reports there could be
thousands of pending corruption allegations of which the political leaders lack
the political will to prosecute to conclusion. Prominent among them includes
the ground breaking mega oil subsidy scam involving about $2.58trn.
Government remains helpless in this
case that has helped in securing a permanent seat for Nigeria as one of the
most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption cases such as loading cash in
private jets across the world, mutilated local currency theft, tax evasion by
oil and gas companies, multiple cases of unremitted billions of dollars to the
federation account, steeling of pension cash, giving and receiving bribes,
wasteful budgeting, remain among the many corrupt practices in Nigeria. Nothing
more is required more than political will on the part of political leaders to
push the frontiers of corruption backwards. (ABUBEKAR; MUSARI, 2015;
TAIWO-OBALONYE, 2015; MERNYI, 2015A; TSA, 2015; MERNYI, 2015B; OJIABOR, 2012;
NWOSU, 2013; ALLI, 2013; ISA, 2014; ERIYE, 2012; ISA, 2014B; NZESH, 2014;
ONANUGA, 2012; ALLI, 2012B; OLUWASEGUN; ANOFI, 2013; MALOGO, 2013)
1.2
Objective of the study
The study was designed to explore
the relevance of political will in anticorruption crusade management in
Nigeria.
1.3
Significance of the study
The study will enable students of
public policy and others, researchers, and the general public have insights
about the relationship between political will and anticorruption crusade
management.
1.4
Delimitation of the study
The study was delimited to Abia
State, South-East Nigeria. Abia State is one of the 36 States in Nigeria and it
was assumed that the views of the people in Abia State will represent the views
of the people in Nigeria.
1.5
Limitations of the study
The study was constrained by lack of
statistics on corruption cases and current literature in the area of study.
However, these important limitations did not impair the academic focus of the
study.
1.6
Hypotheses
To achieve the objective of the
study, the following hypotheses were posed, and test at 0.05 level of
significance:
Ho:
There is no relationship between
political will and anticorruption crusade management
Hi:
There is a relationship between
political will and anticorruption crusade management.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Before the present administration,
preceding administrations in Nigeria had successively instituted legal
instruments, measures and policies designed to combat corruption in the
country. According to Uniamikogbo (2007) these remedial measures did not
achieve the desired results to prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt
practices.
The Corrupt Practices and Other
Related Offences Act 2000 was the first to be passed into law by the Obasanjo
Presidency, while the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences
Commission (ICPC) were inaugurated on the 29th of September 2000. There is
also, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) charged with the
responsibility for the enforcement of all economic and financial crimes, laws,
among other things.
Despite the anxiety of government
over corruption expressed through these reform programmes political will is on
a long holiday, and corruption continues to flourish like the morning rose. As
it grows, it manifests in many ways, like infrastructural decay, poverty, etc.
2.1.
Corruption and Infrastructural decay
The idea of dispensing with public
enterprises was partly due to corruption and inefficiency that led to dwindling
resources. For example, the reform in the telecommunications sector was
motivated by the inability of government to continue to fund public enterprises
being mismanaged and to reduce corruption.
Public sector giants like the Power
Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was riddled with corruption and inefficiency
that led to its dismemberment along geopolitical zones for more reasons of
political patronage and expediency. According to Uniamikogbo (2007) in 1999,
the Federal Government owned a total of 590 Public Enterprises (PEs) worth
about US$100bn as at 1996.
As a result of unproductive
investments in and the inefficiency of these enterprises in terms of the
quality of services rendered, privatization was introduced as a practical
solution. However, as a result of lack of political will, the exercise is today
accused of lack of transparency, and has not yielded any meaningful results in
terms of employment generation and poverty reduction among the citizens.
The abandonment of over 8000
projects that require over N5trn to complete and without any body accountable for
such corruption practices is a display of lack of political will on the part of
government to combat corruption. (ORINTUNSIN, 2014; OMOTOSO, 2011; OGUNWALE,
2012; EMMANUEL, 2014; ALLI, 2012; MALOGO, 2012).
At present, the Federal Government
fears that the privalitzation of NITEL and MTEL was transparent. The rate of
infrastructural decay in Nigeria is alarming. According to Nwachi (2013) a
document prepared by a group of research experts, commissioned by the Federal
Ministry of Finance listed 30 most corrupt institutions in Nigeria with the
police and the defunct Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) as the most
corrupt.
The document which was made
available to Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) ranked the
ministries and parastatals according to their levels of involvement in various
corrupt practices in the past. The first and second most corrupt agencies in
Nigeria have been and still remain the police and defunct PHCN, respectively.
While the third, fourth, fifth and
sixth most corrupt institutions of government are the political parties, the
executive arm of federal, state and local governments, members of the national
and state assemblies and the court. Others are the Customs, Federal Road Safety
Commission, (FRSC) offices of the accountant – general at both federal and
state levels and water boards.
According to the report, no public
service sector is rated, as somewhat or very honest by up to 50 percent. For
the ICPC, it was a pointer in the direction to look for corrupt public
officials in fulfillment of its mandate but nothing was actually done. Grand
corruption cases like the SAGEM, SA. ID Scandal involving about US$241m and the
Halliburton scandal involving about US$182m are yet to be disposed off.
This is perhaps due to impunity.
Corrupt politicians disobey court orders as a means of staying in office. For
example, when a federal high court in Abuja ordered on 2 December 2010, the
immediate reinstatements of six suspended members of the House of
Representative others served notice of appeal. Bankole did not want the
suspended members to return even though the Abuja court had ruled that the
continued suspension of the members was a form of “tyranny of the majority”.
The parliament is critical for
effective anticorruption crusade management. If political will is to be more
than just a slogan, it must be understood in a broad context. Particularly
where democratic politics is in place or emerging in sustainable ways,
political will requires leaders willing to attack corruption and support
agencies ready to back them up, reward success, and exact political price for
failure or deceit (OBIJIOFOR, 2011; NWACHI, 2013; EFULU, 2015; OBINNA, 2015;
OMOMBI, 2015; TAIWO-OHANONYE, 2015; UKEH, 2015).
Corruption in the power sector is yet
to be quantified in terms of Naira and Dollar. Despite billions of dollars
pumped into the sector in the last sixteen years, Nigerians are yet to record
any meaningful improvement in power supply. The senate has now decided to
investigate the matter. According to Anuforo (2015) shortly after the exit of
President Obansanjo, there were outcries that the Power Sector should be
investigated to uncover how over US$12bn reportedly spent to upgrade power
infrastructure was simply stolen and pocketed by the politicians manning the
power ministry.
2.2.
Corruption
and Poverty.
The concept of poverty refers to a
situation in which an individual/community/country lacks the capacity to
independently secure a decent standard of living or decent quality of life.
Specifically, at the individual level poverty is reflected by deprivation and
lack of access to basic necessities of life such as adequate food, decent
clothing, suitable business, safe drinking water, good education, good medical
care, and gainful employment, inability to fulfill social and cultural
obligations that are important (OBASI, 2001).
Although poverty is a world wide
phenomenon, but the prevalence of the disease is compounded in Nigeria due to
corruption. The question of poverty is no longer negotiable in Nigeria of today
where 18 out of 36 state governments owe the workers huge salary arrears of up
to 3-6 months. Some of the governors of the defaulting states are standing
trial on charges of corruption.
Some of them even won fresh
elections. There is no political will on the part of government to avoid
corruption providing incentives for the actions and inactions of corrupt
leaders to deepen poverty through non payment of workers salaries, among
others. Economists suggest that the wage system is a fine way of income
distribution, it therefore follows that when a huge part of the population in a
country does not have regular or steady source of income, it will result to
coefficient inequality between the rich and the poor. Corruption can destroy
the work ethics of citizens and above all, it deepens poverty (GABRIEL, 2015;
MARSHALL, 2006).
Political will is necessary to good
governance architecture that connects broad concerns about how economic,
social, and political institutions are organized with the specific intention of
taking specific steps to reducing corruption and poverty in society.
2.3.
Lessons
from other Countries
According to Hopkinson and Pelizzo
(2006) corruption will always exist, because it cannot be eliminated totally,
but can be curbed or controlled. They insist that corruption is regarded as the
most significant political challenge in most Central and East European
countries. They opine that although corruption is universal, states in
transition, where democracy and a market economy have only recently been
established, are particularly afflicted.
According to Kpundeh (1999)
corruption became a way of life in Sierra Leone during the presidency of
Stevens, Momoh and Strasser, not because of lack of anxiety, but due largely to
lack of political will by government to check corruption. During the period
unscrupulous civil servants, policians, and business people sought to raise
their standards of living through bribery, which in some cases became more
accurately described as extortion.
A lack of political will resulted in
the absence of adequate sanctions or the failure to enforce them. People had to
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of following the rules and decide how
they are best served. Thus, if the benefits outweigh the costs, more people
than not chose wrongdoing as a customary way of supplementing their income. In
this way, corruption was institutionalized in Sierra Leone. Corruption is no
longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all
societies, and economies, making international cooperation to prevent and
control it essential (WILLIAMS, 2006).
Kaufmann (1997) points to the case
of Kenya, where prevalent corruption and its negative macroeconomic
consequences compelled the International Monetary Fund to suspend its lending
in 1997. In the same year, on the heels of mounting pressure from civil society
and the international community the president of Kenya issued pronouncements
against corruption. As a follow-up to the president’s remarks, the office of the
Attorney General released the following statements.
The Government has this morning
formed an anticorruption squad to look into the conduct of the anticorruption
commission, which has been overseeing the anticorruption taskforce, which was
earlier set up to investigate the affairs of a government adhoc committee
appointed earlier this year to look into the issue of high-level corruption
among corrupt Government Officers. Kaufmann (1997) posits that this type of
example may be an extreme case of how not to address the problem of corruption.
Unfortunately many similar statements had been reported in countries in Asia,
Latin America and the former Soviet Union.
It is almost usual for corrupt
politicians to engage in rhetoric about eliminating corruption and the pressure
from the donor community. Nevertheless, statements like the one from Kenya
represent weak political will, because it never showed exactly the direction of
government. In response to pressures for political will, uncommitted political
leaders often show weak political will, which is another constraint to weeding
out corruption.
Such anticorruption rhetoric as a
result of weak political will has been a routine feature of politics invariably
less as a precursor to longer-term reform, than as a means to diffuse
opposition, placate external agencies, and secure political office. In this
context, anticorruption campaigns then degenerate into political rhetoric
designed more to appease foreign donor and international financial institutions
than to address the major issue of combating corruption.
Olowu (1993) posits that in Nigeria political
actors, often talk of accountability and integrity but this by itself does not
translate into a genuine commitment to detect and panelize unethical behavior.
Even when anticorruption agencies are created, they are usually denied the
resources needed to achieve their stated purpose.
In many cases the codes of ethics
they are asked to enforce have no broad-based popular understanding or support.
Furthermore, “the preoccupation with panic measures and the creation of adhoc
panels and tribunals to replace non-functioning legal institutions for ensuring
public accountability have not been particularly helpful”, Olowu (1993) also
posits that in the former Soviet Union, anticorruption legislation was
promulgated that required government officials to make public statements of
personal networth.
However, the legislation was not
accompanied by provisions for verifying information or sanctioning the
submission of false statements. As a result, public cynicism intensified when
some of the nation’s wealthiest individuals reported absurdly low networth
statements, contradicted by their extravagant lifestyles and possessions.
Fatigues, fear, resignation, and
opportunism may diminish the commitment of political reformers and attenuate
political will. As a result, anticorruption may break down, and corruption
continues. Examples abound around the world of exploitative rulers who have
hidden their motives behind a façade of cosmetic measures or well-intended
reformers who have engineered their own destruction through ineffective
strategies.
In the light of these traps,
proponents of political reform processes must look at several indicators that
can serve as demonstrations of political will. Because of weak political will
or lack of it, the Presidency of Momoh in the Sierra Leone was accused of being
drenched in sectionalism, tribalism, favouritism, nepotism, incompetence,
ineptitude, treachery, indolence, wining, dining and womanizing, which
inflicted the severest mismanagement of the affairs of the country (WILLIAM,
1995; SIERRA LEONE NEWS AGENCIES, 1992; WILLIAM, 1996a, 1996b).
One of the greatest dangers of
corruption is that it weakens trust in government. It undermines the legitimacy
of political leaders and their institutions. According to Kpundeh (1999)
revelations of misdeeds have led people to believe that public officials wish
only to get rich at their expense, that the country’s resources are being
wasted and stolen, and that-bribery is the quickest way to get things done.
These attitudes have led to serious
crises of confidence in both public officials and public institutions. He
emphasizes that corruption adversely affects democratic processes. Cases of
money disappearing from governmental treasuries are indications of the
disastrous effects of corruption to democratic institutions, and economic
mismanagement create poverty.
Good political will leads to good
governance because it has a reciprocal dimension which entails efficient and
effective reciprocity between rulers and the ruled with responsiveness
incumbent upon the government (KPUNDEH, 1992, 1993, 1995).
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1.
Research
design
Exploratory research design was used
for the study. Exploratory research design is used to study and gain insight
into a situation that is not very clear and that has not attracted serious
investigation and research in the past. The objective of exploratory research
is to define a problem more succinctly and develop course or courses of action
that will lead to its solution. The nature of exploratory research requires the
use of a flexible research process. It is evolutionary and historical in nature
and it rarely involves the employment of large samples or use of structured
questionnaire. A typical example of an exploratory research is a case study of
a problem situation (ASIKA, 2004).
3.2.
Population and samples
The study population is comprised of
the people in Nigeria. The sample of the study was selected through the simple
random sampling method. The sample size was determined using the Yamane’s
technique.
3.3.
Data collection method.
Data were collected from both
primary and secondary sources. Secondary data were collected using a schedule
titled “Corruption Index Format” (CIFO). The CIFO was designed with five
columns. Primary data were generated through a 7-point Likert-type
questionnaire. Previous investigations have found the Likert scale
questionnaire to be acceptably internally consistent, with a Cronbach’s Alpha value
of about .82. Content and construct validity has also been established (MADSEN,
2003a). Data collected were supplemented, complemented and validated through
each other by discussions, interviews, and observations.
3.4.
Method of data analysis
Data were analyzed through
descriptive and Chi-square statistical methods. The results were presented in
tables capable of understanding and re-analysis.
4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
Table1: Selected Reported Outstanding
Corruption Allegation Cases in Nigeria As At 2015
S/N |
Amount |
Secondary Source |
Brief Description |
Status |
|
$ |
|
||||
1 |
$9.7m
|
|
Guardian
vol. 31, No. 13319 |
Private
loaded with cash seized in South Africa |
Pending
|
2 |
$7.5bn
|
|
Daily
sun, vol. 10, No. 3161 |
Tax
evasion by oil & gas companies |
Pending
|
3 |
$9.8bn |
|
Daily
sun, vol. 10, No. 3167 |
Amount
unremitted to NEITL by IOCs |
Pending
|
4 |
$11.6bn
|
|
Daily
sun vol. 10, No. 3161 |
Total
amount due to FGN for 2012 not paid by oil & gas industry. |
Pending
|
5
|
|
N8bn |
Daily
sun, vol. 10, No. 3165 |
Part
of local currency scam involving CBN officials |
Pending
|
6
|
|
N15bn |
Daily
sun, vol. 10, No. 3165 |
Corruption
charge against Nyako, others by EFCC |
Pending
|
7 |
|
N62bn |
Sunday
sun, vol. 10, No. 628 |
Corruption
charge against Orji’s, son by EFCC |
Pending
|
8
|
$8.8m |
|
Daily
sun, vol. 10, No. 3165 |
Corruption
charge against oil & gas Chief Deepak, K. |
Pending
|
9
|
$2,58trn
|
|
Nation
vol. 7, No. 2553 |
Mega-oil
subsidy scam since 2011/2013 |
Pending
|
10
|
$30trn
|
|
Vanguard,
vol. 25, No. 62332 |
Allegations
of economic mess by C.C Soludo |
No
clearer information |
11 |
$20bn
|
|
Nation
vol. 8, No. 2701 |
Allegations
of unremitted money against NNPC by CBN governor |
Pending
|
12
|
$49bn |
|
Nation
vol. 8, No. 2701 |
Allegations
of missing money against NNPC by CBN governor |
Pending
|
13
|
|
N500bn
|
Nation
vol. 8, No. 2701 |
Allegations
of missing SURE-P money |
No
clearer details |
14 |
|
N1.3trn
|
National
vol. 7, No. 2316 |
Allegations
of debt owed NNPC by FGN |
Pending |
15
|
$32.3bn
|
|
Daily
sun, vol. 10, No. 3150 |
Allegations
of mismanagement of public fund by FG |
Pending
|
16
|
$13bn
|
|
Daily
sun, vol. 10, No. 2761 |
Allegations
of remittance of only $17 out of $20bn oil money by NNPC |
Pending
|
17 |
|
N22bn
|
Nation
vol. 8, No. 2695 |
Allegations
of sum not remitted to FG by NNPC - Sanusi |
Pending
|
18 |
|
N24bn
|
New
telegraph vol. 1, No. 23 |
Allegations
of missing police pension money |
Defended
by CME |
19 |
$1.3trn
|
|
Nation,
vol. 7, No. 2316 |
Govt.
owes us $1.3trn on subsidy |
Pending
|
20
|
$43m |
|
Nation,
Dec. 27, pp. 15 |
Allegation
of profiteering on aviation fuel |
No
clearer details |
21
|
$1.7trn
|
|
Guardian
vol. 29, No. 12185 |
Refund
of amount misapplied by NNPC and others in the oil subsidy scam |
Report
not yet adopted. No refund made |
22
|
$620000 |
|
Nation
vol. 06, No. 2170 |
Bribery
allegation against Lawan by Otedola |
No
clearer news again |
23 |
|
N118n |
New
telegraph, vol. 1, No. 23 |
Amount
allegedly recovered by FMOF through ghost workers elimination |
No
news |
24
|
|
N295b
|
New
telegraph vol. 1, No. 2 |
Allegations
of wasteful budget allocation |
No
news |
25
|
|
N4,6bn |
Nation,
vol. 7, No. 2270 |
EFCC
arraigns 13 new marketers over oil subsidy fraud |
No
news |
26 |
|
N382bn |
Nation,
Vol. 7, No. 2302 |
Fuel
subsidy fraud: EFCC grills 11 more marketers |
No
news |
27 |
|
N109m |
Nation
Vol. 7, No. 2283 |
Alleged
N109m pension fraud |
In
court |
28 |
|
N750bn |
Nation
vol. 8, No. 2701 |
Allegations
of annual oil money theft by Tambuwal |
No
news |
29 |
|
N255m
|
Nation
vol. 8, No. 2701 |
Allegations
of poor handling of bullet proof car scam by Tambuwal |
No
news |
30 |
|
N5trn
|
Nation,
vol. 9, No. 3080 |
Alleged
cost of abandoned projects by N.A Darma, Fmr director NPC |
No
news |
31 |
$1182m |
|
Sunday
Vanguard, vol. 24, No. 1483 |
Bribery
case against Halliburton |
Still
pending |
32 |
|
N474bn
|
Daily
Sun, vol. 10, No. 3192 |
Allegations
of bureaucratic corruption against ex-gov. Senator T.A Orji of Abia State |
No.
Clearer direction yet |
33 |
Multimillion
|
Multibillion |
Daily
Sun, Vol. 10, No. 3211 |
Perceptions
of lack of transparency in the liquidation of NITEL/MTEL |
To
be probed by the FG |
34
|
|
N3.180bn
|
Daily
Sun, vol. 10, No. 3211 |
Allegations
of misappropriation of N3.180bn MDG’s funds by the SSAp |
Fresh
petition by Efulu |
35
|
US$241m |
|
Energy
Today, Vol. 2, No. 15, pp: 7 |
SAGEM,
SA ID Card Scandal |
In
the cooler |
36 |
|
N1trn
|
Daily
Sun, vol. 10, No. 3216, pp:12 |
Allegations
of diversion of N1trn against the EFCC boss |
Before
the senate Ethics committee |
37 |
|
N183.7bn
|
Daily
Sun vol. 10, No 3216, pp: 46 |
Allegations
of misappropriation between 2008/12 at NDDC |
before
the presidency |
38 |
|
N567bn
|
Daily
Sun, vol. 10, No. 3218, pp 49 |
Allegations
of illegal spending by CG NCS |
Petition
before the presidency |
39 |
|
Multibillion
naira |
Daily
Sun, vol. 10, No. 3218 pp. 5 |
Allegations
of fraud against SGF over Centenary city project |
Petition
before the presidency |
40 |
US$12bn
|
|
The
Guardian, vol. 32, No. 13402 |
Allegations
of stealing US$12bn meant for the power sector by politicians |
Under
senate probe. |
Source: Fieldwork,
2015.
Table 2: History of some Abandoned Projects in Nigeria As At 2015
S/N |
Brief description |
Amount |
Secondary source |
Status |
Remarks |
|
$ |
|
|||||
1 |
As
at 1993 4000 federal government abandoned projects all over Nigeria |
|
300bn
|
Guardian
vol. 29 No. 11922 – 2011-
12 – 8 - |
Abandoned
projects |
Houses,
schools, roads, bridges, railway tracks, dams, tunnels, air ports, seaports,
etc |
2 |
Between
1986 and 2009 14 abandoned road projects in Ondo State |
|
2.1bn
|
Guardian
vol. 29, No 11922. 12-8-2011 |
Abandoned
projects |
Roads,
houses, churches, etc. |
3
|
In
2012 the high profile Lagos – Ibadan Expressway project was cancelled by the
federal government |
|
89.53bn
|
The
Nation, vol. 7, No. 2316 |
Not
clear |
Allegations
of lack of project finance and competence. |
4
|
8000
– abandoned federal government projects as at 2014 |
|
5trn
|
The
Nation, vol. 9, No. 3080 |
No
clear and full details |
Too
many abandoned projects |
5 |
Ajaokuta
steel complex |
Multi
billion |
|
Sunday
Vanguard vol. 24, No. 1479 |
Abandoned
for many years |
Demons
are being blamed |
Source: Fieldwork, 2015
Table 3: List of 18 Out of 36 States In
Nigeria Unable To Pay Workers Salaries for Over 3 months as at 29/5/15
S/N
|
Name
of state |
Remarks
|
1 |
Abia |
Workers lamenting their ugly plight |
2 |
Akwa Ibom |
” |
3 |
Bauchi |
” |
4 |
Benue |
” |
5 |
Cross River |
” |
6 |
Ekiti |
” |
7 |
Imo |
” |
8 |
Jigawa |
” |
9 |
Kano |
” |
10 |
Katsina |
” |
11 |
Kogi |
” |
12 |
Ogun |
” |
13 |
Ondo |
” |
14 |
Osun |
” |
15 |
Oyo |
” |
16 |
Plateau |
” |
17 |
Rivers |
” |
18 |
Zamfara |
” |
Source: Field work: 2015
Table 4: List of States With External
Debts As At 29/5/2015
S/N
|
Name
of state |
Amount
($) |
Status
|
1 |
Lagos |
$1.087bn |
Outstanding |
2 |
Kaduna |
$234m |
” |
3 |
Cross River |
$131,469m |
” |
4 |
Edo |
$123m |
” |
5 |
Osun |
$109m |
” |
6 |
Bauchi |
$87m |
” |
7 |
Enugu |
$62m |
” |
8 |
Katsina |
$78m |
” |
9 |
Osun |
$67m |
” |
10 |
Oyo |
$72m |
” |
Source: Field work, 2015
Table 5: Nigeria’s Poverty Levels
(2004-2011)
Poverty
measure (in %) |
2004 |
2010 |
2011 |
Relative
poverty |
54.4 |
69 |
71.5 |
Absolute
poverty |
54.7 |
60.9 |
61.9 |
Dollar per
day |
62.8 |
61.2 |
62.8 |
Source: Okafor, 2014.
Table 6: Frequencies
Measures |
Observed N |
Expected N |
Residual |
9.00 25.00 43.00 96.00 212.00 Total |
9 25 43 96 212 385 |
77.0 77.0 77.0 77.0 77.0 |
-68.0 -52.0 -34.0 19.0 135.0 |
Table 7: Test Statistics
Chi-Squarea df Asymp. Sig. |
351.558 4 .000 |
a. 0 cell (.0%) have expected
frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 77.0.
4.1.
Discussion
From the evidence in table 1 there
is now no doubt in this study that there is corruption in Nigeria. There has
always been rhetorics of anticorruption crusade in Nigeria from the military
regimes of the 1960-1990s and more since the present democratic experiment. With
the pretences at anticorruption crusade no meaningful result has been achieved
even since the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences, Act of 2000 was
passed into law.
This is true because it is difficult
if not impossible to reduce corruption if the government does not have the
political will to curb it, ensure that the anticorruption agencies are not
corrupt, punish corrupt officials, or reduce opportunities and incentives for
corruption in vulnerable governmental agencies and parastatals (UNIAMIKOGBO,
2007).
The basic question should not be if
there should be anticorruption agencies as is often debated in late developing
democracies, but rather how to make them effective. Government must have the
political will to ensure that anti-corruption agencies are independent,
autonomous, secure from illicit influence, and have adequate means and
knowledge to conduct their work.
To combat corruption effectively
anticorruption bodies need a mandate broad enough to gather all relevant
information, as well as being protected from political, and personal pressure,
introducing at the same time strict rules of control over the interests,
income, and property of the officials. Such political will, will also make it
possible for the anticorruption agencies to have the financial, material, and
other resources necessary to perform the required functions creditably (HOPKINSON;
PELIZZO, 2006).
The political will to combat
corruption is also the political will to pursue other issues necessary for good
governance. Political will is essential for the unity of a nation and the
happiness of the citizens. Strong political will is similar to Gowon’s 1966
proposal for the unity of Nigeria. “Rule out disintegration, rule out
unitarism, consider federalism with a strong centre, consider federalism with a
weak centre, and if neither is acceptable, then construct an entirely new
system unique to Nigeria”.
This example implicates the fact
that political will must reflect the character of popular democratic
intervention, departing from pressure group or political manifesto rhetoric to
becoming a significant voice, seriously posing the questions and views of
people serving governance as a practical and immediate political possibility.
Political will is the critical
starting point to halt and begin to reverse the deepening pauperization and
disempowerment of the Nigerian people by the ruling classes and power blocs
whose interests, run counter to the needs of the great majority (MADUNAGU,
2011; WILLIAMS, 2000).
Corruption due to lack of political
will to curb it, has resulted in the abandonment of many projects in Nigeria.
As reflected in table 2, the values of the abandoned projects mostly reflect
government money stolen by corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, business people,
and sundry others.
Corruption through contract
inflation in Nigeria has grown from the 10 percent mark-up, or the “wee my own”
syndrome in the 1960s and 1990s to 100 percent bribery of the moment (OMOTOSO,
2011). The present phenomenon has surpassed the Sierra Leonean corruption and
bribery password of “put for me” (KPUNDEH, 1997). Significant others in
Nigerian governance project are agitated at the high levels of abandoned
projects which grew from 4000 in 1993 to 8000 in 2014.
Agbakwuru (2015) reports the Speaker
of the Federal House of Representatives stating that “demons” could be
responsible for abandoning projects like the Ajaokuta Steel Mill in Kogi state.
The matter is as serious as that. Abandonment of huge projects leads to
unemployment and poverty.
In a country where half of the
federating states do not pay salaries as and when due, where the treasuries are
cleaned up by political leaders, it would mean that the majority of the people
would wallow in absolute poverty. Because of corruption and the lack of
political will to combat it, absolute poverty rate grew from 55 percent in 2004
to about 63 percent in 2011 (OKAFOR, 2014).
The confirmation of the G.7 Leaders
of industrialized nations that the Nigerian government is facing severe
handicaps due to lack of resources and mismanagement suggest that corruption is
the mother of poverty. In the midst of poverty people elected to represent the
people often waste time debating their pay, refreshments, meals, and sometimes,
the age of little girls they can marry (OJIABR, 2012).
According to Fani-Kayode (2013)
“Every Nigerian should bow his or her head in shame from today because what the
senate did and seeks to do in the future by beginning the process to amend our
constitution in order for it to cater for their filthy appetite, and godless
fantasies of child molesters and sexual predators is sordid, ugly and
unforgiveable.
To curb corruption in the chambers
and ensure sound law making, parliamentary codes of conduct can help by
providing a frame work within which members and the public can know what
behavior is expected of members. They can serve as a means of encouraging the
observance of high standards and of helping to develop a culture of compliance,
openness and accountability and ensure that in the councils of government,
members must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether
sought or unsought.
The level of corruption in Nigeria
has risen so high that people now want to blame the “demons” for inflicting the
epidemic on the country. Since the 1970s there have been accusations and
counter accusations of corruption in the governance of Nigeria bordering on
brazen acts of indiscipline in all its ramifications, misappropriation of
public funds that went unchallenged, oil merchants and agents owing their
massive wealth to illegal oil deals, contract inflation etc Agwunobi (2005).
While all these went on, salaries of
civil servants and teachers remained unpaid, hospitals remained without drugs,
schools without textbooks as states are unable to meat their statutory
obligations (HOPKINSON; PELIZZO, 2006; ELAIGWU, 1985; NELSON, 2015). With a
high Chi-square value of about 352, against a table value of approximately 9, a
strong positive relationship between political will and anticorruption crusade
management was established.
4.2.
Recommendations
i) Elected and appointed government officials have the
responsibility to discharge the functions of their offices without fear or
favour for the benefits of the greater majority. The governments must enforce
this.
ii) Political will is required in governance not only to curb
corruption but also to pursue other legitimate goals. Contemporary political
leaders can learn a lot from the political will of Gowon exemplified by his
1966 proposal. “Rule out disintegration; Rule out unitarism, consider
federalism with a strong centre; consider federalism with a weak centre; where
neither is acceptable, then construct an entirely new system unique to
Nigeria”. This is political will in action.
iii) Political will does not start nor end with the establishment
of anticorruption agencies. The laws establishing them must be clear enough,
and they must have the necessary autonomy to perform. Instances where the law
stipulates penalties for people not declaring their assets, and none for those
falsifying such information do not present a political will to curb corruption.
iv) Curbing corruption will require amending some aspects of the
Nigerian Constitution such as the immunity clause that provides great incentive
for corruption in high political places.
v) With over 8000 abandoned projects in Nigeria that requires
about N5trn to complete, government should urgently revisit the issue as a
major step in anticorruption crusade management. This is important because
contractors, politicians and high level bureaucrats simply share mobilization
and final contract fees and disappear, only for us to turnaround to blame “demons and witches” for the
abandonments. It is doubtful if demons take bribes like most politicians do.
4.3.
Scope for further study
Further study should examine the
relationship between corruption and instability of government. This is crucial
because there is empirical evidence that corruption undermines the legitimacy
of government.
5. CONCLUSION
The ugly challenge of endemic
political corruption has continued to put countries into serious problems of
underdevelopment, due to weak political will or the total lack of it to curb
it. Corruption in whatever form is largely responsible for breeding a group of people
in the corridors of political power frequently drenched in sectionalism,
tribalism, despotism, favouritism, nepotism, incompetence, dictatorship,
ineptitude, treachery, indolence, winning, dining, political rascalism and
womanizing that bring about infrastructural decay, poverty and the worst,
mismanagement of the affairs of a nation.
This exploration provided fresh
empirical evidence to buttress the postulation that political will is a major
instrument of anticorruption crusade management and the fact that the absence
of it provides the incentive for monumental corruption deeply associated with
abandonment of government projects and absolute poverty among the citizens of a
nation. Political will to curb corruption is also the political will to pursue
other national goals, like national unity. It is not equivalent to a pressure
group approach or political manifesto rhetorics.
Rather it is a reflection of the
commitment of the political leadership to take decisive actions. An example of
political will is reflected in Gowon’s 1966 proposal for national unity. “Rule
out disintegration, Rule out unitarism, Consider federalism with a strong
centre, consider federalism with a weak centre, and where none is acceptable,
then construct an entirely new system unique to Nigeria”. Through statistical
analysis the study found a strong positive relationship between political will
and anticorruption crusade management.
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